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A NOTE ON THE CONSISTENCY OPERATOR
JAMES WALSH
Abstract. It is a well known empirical observation that natural axiomatic
theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength. For any natural theory
T , the next strongest natural theory is T ` ConT . We formulate and prove
a statement to the effect that the consistency operator is the weakest natural
way to uniformly extend axiomatic theories.
1. Introduction
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem states that no consistent sufficiently
strong effectively axiomatized theory T proves its own consistency statement ConT .
Using ad hoc proof-theoretic techniques (namely, Rosser-style self-reference) one
can construct Π1 sentences ϕ that are not provable in T such that T ` ϕ is a
strictly weaker theory than T `ConT . Nevertheless, ConT seems to be the weakest
natural Π1 sentence that is not provable in T . Without a mathematical definition
of “natural,” however, it is difficult to formulate a precise conjecture that would
explain this phenomenon. This is a special case of the well known empirical obser-
vation that natural axiomatic theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength,
which S. Friedman, Rathjen, and Weiermann [1] call one of the “great mysteries in
the foundations of mathematics.”
Recursion theorists have observed a similar phenomenon in Turing degree the-
ory. One can use ad hoc recursion-theoretic methods like the priority method to
construct non-recursive Σ1 definable sets whose Turing degree is strictly below that
of 01. Nevertheless, 01 seems to be the weakest natural non-recursive r.e. degree.
Once again, without a mathematical definition of “natural,” however, it is difficult
to formulate a precise conjecture that would explain this phenomenon.
A popular approach to studying natural Turing degrees is to focus on degree-
invariant functions; a function f on the reals is degree-invariant if, for all reals A
and B, A ”T B implies fpAq ”T fpBq. The definitions of natural Turing degrees
tend to relativize to arbitrary degrees, yielding degree invariant functions on the
reals; for instance, the construction of 01 relativizes to yield the Turing Jump. Sacks
[3] asked whether there is a degree invariant solution to Post’s Problem. Recall that
a function W : 2ω Ñ 2ω is a recursively enumerable operator if there is an e P ω
such that, for each A, W pAq “WAe , the e
th set recursively enumerable in A.
Question 1.1 (Sacks). Is there a degree-invariant recursively enumerable operator
W such that for every real A, A ăT W
A
e ăT A
1?
Though the question remains open, Slaman and Steel [4] proved that there is no
order-preserving solution to Post’s Problem. Recall that a function f on the reals
is order-preserving if, for all reals, A and B, A ďT B implies fpAq ďT fpBq.
Thanks to Antonio Montalbán for his comments and suggestions.
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In [2], Montalbán and the author proved a proof-theoretic analogue of a negative
answer to Sacks’ question for order-preserving functions. Let T be a consistent
sufficiently strong effectively axiomatized theory in the language of arithmetic, e.g.,
EA.1 A function g is monotone if, for all sentences ϕ and ψ, T $ ϕ Ñ ψ implies
T $ gpϕq Ñ gpψq (this is just to say that g induces a monotone function on the
Lindenbaum algebra of T ). Let rϕs denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo T
provable equivalence, i.e., rϕs :“ tψ : T $ ϕ Ø ψu. One of the main theorems of
[2] is the following.
Theorem 1.2 (Montalbán–W.). Let g be recursive and monotone such that:
‚ for all ϕ, T $ ConT pϕq Ñ gpϕq
‚ for all consistent ϕ, T & ϕÑ gpϕq
Then for every true ϕ, there is a true ψ such that T $ ψ Ñ ϕ and
rψ ^ gpψqs “ rψ ^ ConT pψqs.
To state a corollary of this theorem, we recall that ϕ strictly implies ψ if one of
the following holds:
(i) T ` ϕ $ ψ and T ` ψ & ϕ.
(ii) rϕs “ rψs “ rKs.
Corollary 1.3. There is no recursive monotone g such that for every ϕ,`
ϕ^ ConT pϕq
˘
strictly implies
`
ϕ^ gpϕq
˘
and
`
ϕ^ gpϕq
˘
strictly implies ϕ.
The Slaman–Steel theorem suggests a strengthening of these results. Recall that
a cone in the Turing degrees is a set C Ď R such that for some A, for every B ěT A,
B P C. We say that a function f is strictly increasing if, for all A, A ăT fpAq. The
following is a special case of a theorem due to Slaman and Steel.
Theorem 1.4 (Slaman–Steel). Let f : 2ω Ñ 2ω be Borel and order-preserving.
Then one of the following holds:
(1) fpAq ďT A on a cone.
(2) A1 ďT fpAq on a cone.
Montalbán and the author asked whether Theorem 1.2 could be strengthened in
the style of the Slaman–Steel theorem, i.e., by showing that all increasing monotone
recursive functions that are no stronger than the consistency operator are equivalent
to the consistency operator in the limit. In this note we provide a positive answer
to this question.
To sharpen the notion of the “limit behavior” of a function, we introduce the
notion of a true cone. A cone is any set C such that, for some ϕ, for every ψ, if
T ` ψ $ ϕ then ψ P C. A true cone is a cone that contains true sentence. In §2 we
prove that for any g meeting the conditions of Theorem 1.2, if g produces only Π1
sentences, then g coincides with the consistency operator on a true cone.
Theorem 1.5. Let g be recursive and monotone such that, for all ϕ, gpϕq is Π1.
Then one of the following holds:
(1) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ $ gpϕq.
1
EA is a theory in the language of arithmetic (with exponentiation) axiomatized by the Q
axioms, recursive axioms for exponentiation, and induction for bounded formulas.
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(2) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ` gpϕq $ ConT pϕq.
In §3 we prove that the condition that g is recursive cannot be weakened. More
precisely, we exhibit a monotone 01 recursive function which vacillates between
behaving like the identity operator and behaving like the consistency operator.
Theorem 1.6. There is a 01 recursive monotone function g such that, for every
ϕ, gpϕq is Π1, yet for cofinally many true sentences
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^ ConT pϕqs
and for cofinally many true sentences
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕs.
Though Theorem 1.5 is a considerable strengthening of the result in [2], we
conjecture that it admits of a dramatic improvement. We remind the reader that
the aforementioned theorem of Slaman and Steel is a special case of a sweeping
classification of increasing Borel order-preserving function.
Theorem 1.7 (Slaman–Steel). Let f : 2ω Ñ 2ω be Borel and order-preserving.
Suppose that for some α ă ω1, fpAq ďT A
pαq for every A. Then for some β ď α,
fpAq ”T A
pβq for almost every A.
We conjecture that a similar classification of monotone proof-theoretic operators
is possible. Our conjecture is stated in terms of iterated consistency statements.
Let ă be an elementary presentation of a recursive well-ordering. We define the
iterates of the consistency operator by appealing to Gödel’s fixed point lemma.
T $ ConαT pϕq Ø @β ă αConT
`
ϕ^ ConβT pϕq
˘
For true ϕ, the iterations of ConT form a proper hierarchy of true sentences by
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. We make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1.8. Suppose g is monotone and recursive such that, for every ϕ,
gpϕq P Π1. Let ă be an elementary presentation of well-ordering and α an ordinal
notation. Suppose that, for every ϕ,
T ` ϕ` ConαT pϕq $ gpϕq.
Then for some β ĺ α, for all ϕ in a true cone,
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^ ConβT pϕqs.
According to the conjecture, if an increasing monotone recursive function g that
produces only Π1 sentences is no stronger than Con
α
T , it is equivalent on a true
cone to ConβT for some β ĺ α. This would provide a classification of a large class
of monotone proof-theoretic operators in terms of their limit behavior.
2. The main theorem
Let T be a sound, recursively axiomatized extension of EA in the language of
arithmetic. We want to show that T ` ConT pϕq is the weakest natural theory that
results from adjoining a Π1 sentence to T . A central notion in our approach is that
of a monotone operator on finite extensions of T .
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Definition 2.1. g is monotone if, for every ϕ and ψ,
T $ ϕÑ ψ implies T $ gpϕq Ñ gpψq.
Our goal is to prove that the consistency operator is, roughly, the weakest opera-
tor for uniformly strengthening theories. Our strategy is to show that any uniform
method for extending theories that is as weak as the consistency operator must be
equivalent to the consistency operator in the limit. We sharpen the notion “in the
limit” with the following definitions.
Definition 2.2. Given a sentence ϕ, the cone generated by ϕ is the set of all
sentences ψ such that T $ ψ Ñ ϕ. A cone is any set C such that, for some ϕ, C
is the cone generated by ϕ. A true cone is a cone that is generated by a sentence
that is true in the standard model N.
We are now ready to state and prove the main theorem.
Theorem 2.3. Let g be recursive and monotone such that, for all ϕ, gpϕq is Π1.
Then one of the following holds:
(1) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ $ gpϕq.
(2) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ` gpϕq $ ConT pϕq.
Proof. Since g is recursive, its graph is defined by a Σ1 formula G, i.e., for any ϕ
and ψ,
gpϕq “ ψ ðñ N ( Gpxϕy, xψyq.
Since T is sound and Σ1 complete, this implies that for any ϕ and ψ,
(‹) gpϕq “ ψ ðñ T $ Gpxϕy, xψyq
From now on we drop the corner quotes and write Gpϕ, ψq instead of Gpxϕy, xψyq,
trusting that no confusion will arise.
We consider the following sentence in the language of arithmetic:
(A) @x@y
´`
Gpx, yq ^ TrueΠ1pyq
˘
Ñ ConT pxq
¯
.
Informally, A says that, for every ϕ, gpϕq implies ConT pϕq. Note that we need to
use a partial truth predicate in the statement A since we are formalizing a uniform
claim about the outputs of the function g. For any specific output ψ of the function
g, T will be able to reason about ψ without relying on the partial truth predicate.
We break into cases based on whether A is true or false.
Case 1: A is true in the standard model N. We claim that in this case
C :“ tϕ : T $ ϕÑ Au
satisfies condition (2) from the statement of the theorem. Clearly C is a true cone.
It suffices to show that for any ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ` gpϕq $ ConT pϕq.
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So let ϕ P C and let ψ “ gpϕq. We reason as follows.
T ` ϕ $ @x@y
´`
Gpx, yq ^ TrueΠ1pyq
˘
Ñ ConT pxq
¯
by choice of C.
T ` ϕ $
`
Gpϕ, ψq ^ TrueΠ1pψq
˘
Ñ ConT pϕq by instantiation.
T ` ϕ $ Gpϕ, ψq by observation p‹q.
T ` ϕ $ TrueΠ1pψq Ñ ConT pϕq by logic.
T ` ϕ` ψ $ ConT pϕq.
Case 2: A is false in the standard model N. We infer that
DϕDψ
´
Gpϕ, ψq ^ TrueΠ1pψq ^  ConT pϕq
¯
.
Thus, there is an inconsistent sentence ϕ such that gpϕq is a true Π1 sentence. This
is to say that gpKq is true. We claim that in this case
C :“ tϕ : T $ ϕÑ gpKqu
satisfies condition (1) from the statement of the theorem. Clearly C is a true cone.
It suffices to show that for any ϕ P C,
T ` ϕ $ gpϕq.
So let ϕ P C. We reason as follows.
T $ K Ñ ϕ by logic
T $ gpKq Ñ gpϕq by monotonicity
T ` ϕ $ gpϕq by choice of C
This completes the proof. ❑
3. Recursiveness is a necessary condition
In the proof of Theorem 2.3 we appealed to the recursiveness of g to show that
T correctly calculates the values of g, i.e., that for every ϕ and ψ,
gpϕq “ ψ ðñ T $ Gpxϕy, xψyq.
In this section we show that recursiveness is a necessary condition for the proof of
Theorem 2.3. In particular, we exhibit a monotone operator g which is recursive in
01 and produces only Π1 sentences but does not satisfy the conclusion of Theorem
2.3. In particular, for cofinally many true ϕ,
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^ ConT pϕqs
and for cofinally many true sentences
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕs.
Our proof makes use of the following proposition from [2].
Proposition 3.1 (Montalbán–W.). There is an r.e. set A that contains arbitrarily
strong true sentences and omits arbitrarily strong true sentences.
We recall the construction of the set A, which is necessary to understand the
proof of the theorem. The interested reader can find the proofs that A has the
desired properties in [2].
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Let tϕ0, ϕ1, ...u be an effective Gödel numbering of the language of
arithmetic. We describe the construction of A in stages. During a
stage n we may activate a sentence ψ, in which case we say that ψ
is active until it is deactivated at some later stage n` k.
Stage 0: Numerate ϕ0 and  ϕ0 into A. Activate the sentences
pϕ0 ^ ConT pϕ0qq and p ϕ0 ^ ConT p ϕ0qq.
Stage n+1: There are finitely many active sentences. For each
such sentence ψ, numerate θ0 :“ pψ^ϕn`1q and θ1 :“ pψ^ ϕn`1q
into A. Deactivate the sentence ψ and activate the sentences pθ0 ^
ConT pθ0qq and pθ1 ^ ConT pθ1qq.
Our proof also makes use of iterated consistency statements. Let ă be an ele-
mentary presentation of ω. We define the iterates of the consistency operator by
appealing to Gödel’s fixed point lemma.
T $ ConαT pϕq Ø @β ă αConT
`
ϕ^ ConβT pϕq
˘
For true ϕ, the iterates of ConT form a proper hierarchy of true sentences by Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem.
We are now ready to state and prove the theorem.
Theorem 3.2. There is a 01 recursive monotone function g such that, for every
ϕ, gpϕq is Π1, yet for cofinally many true sentences
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^ ConT pϕqs
and for cofinally many true sentences
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕs.
Proof. We define the function g as follows:
gpϕq “
#Ź
tConT pψq : ψ P A and T ` ϕ $ ψu if rϕs ‰ rKs.
K otherwise
Clearly g always produces a Π1 sentence. It is routine to see that g is monotone.
To show that g is 01 recursive, we informally describe an algorithm for calculating
g using 01 as an oracle. Given an input ϕ, first use 01 to determine whether rϕs “ rKs.
If so, output K. Otherwise, we have to find all sentences ψ P A such that T `ϕ $ ψ.
Let’s say that ϕ is the nth sentence in our Gödel numbering of the language of
arithmetic. By the construction of A, the only sentences in A that T ` ϕ proves
must have been numerated into A by stage n. So find each of the finitely many
sentences that were activated by stage n in the construction of A. 01 can determine
of any such sentence ψ whether T ` ϕ $ ψ. Once all sentences ψ P A such that
T`ϕ $ ψ have been found, output the conjunction of their consistency statements.
Note that whenever ϕ P A, we have that rgpϕqs “ rConT pϕqs, whence
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^ ConT pϕqs.
It suffices to see that for cofinally many true ϕ, T $ ϕÑ gpϕq.
Let ψ be a true sentence in A. Let’s say that ψ was numerated into A at
stage n. Let θψ be a true sentence that is either the nth sentence in the Gödel
numbering of the language or the negation thereof (depending on which is true).
Then the next true sentence numerated into A is
`
ψ ^ ConT pψq ^ θψ
˘
. So as long
as T & pψ ^ ConT pψqq Ñ θψ, this means that pψ ^ ConT q R A.
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Let’s suppose that T & pψ^ConT pψqq Ñ θψ and hence that
`
ψ^ConT pψq
˘
R A.
Then every sentence that is in A and is implied by
`
ψ^ConT pψq
˘
is implied by ψ,
by the construction of A. Let ϕ :“ ψ ^ ConT pψq. Then
rϕ^ gpϕqs “ rϕ^
ľ
tConT pψq : ψ P A and T $ ϕÑ ψus “ rϕ^ ConT pψqs “ rϕs.
It suffices to show that for cofinally many true sentences ψ P A,
T & pψ ^ ConT pψqq Ñ θψ.
Suppose not, i.e., suppose that there is a true ϕ such that for all true ψ, if both
T $ ψ Ñ ϕ and ψ P A, then T $ pψ ^ ConT pψqq Ñ θψ. This means that the true
sentences numerated into A after ψ is numerated into A are
xψ ^ ConT pψq, ψ ^ Con
2
T pψq, ...y.
Since only finitely many true sentences were numerated into A before ψ there is some
strongest such sentence ζ. But then no sentence in A is stronger than ζ^ConωT pψq.
Thus, no sentence in A implies
ζ ^ ConωT pψq ^ ConT pζ ^ Con
ω
T pψqq,
contradicting the fact that A contains arbitrarily strong true sentences. ❑
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